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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

i»liOEBE H. DlTRRANT,
Plai,ntiff and Respondent,
Case
No.10082

-YS.-

X.:\~CY I)li~LTON,

Defrndauf

and Appella,ut.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
~T.:\TE~IENrr

OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the
plnintiff for damages occurring when a vehicle driven by
the defendant collided with the plaintiff's vehicle which
w·as stalled on \"\T asatch Boulevard in or partly within a
traveled lane at about 3 :20 or 5 :30 p.m. on ~larch 11,
1963.
Dl~Pl)SlTIOX

BY THE TRIAL COURT

The l'a:'e "·as submitted to a jury which returned
n Yerdict for plaintiff in the amount of $656.37.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-appellant seeks to vacate the judgment entered in the plaintiff's favor and an order of this
court that the case be remanded to the District Court for
a new trial.
STATEJ\fENT OF FACTS
The appellant's statement of facts does not comply
with the rule of this court that they should be set forth
not merely as the appellant contends them to be but as
they must be viewed on appeal; that is, favorable to the
verdict of the jury, so the respondent will set forth her
own statement of facts.
On March 11, 1963, at about the hour of 5 :20 or 5 :30
p.m. (R 95) the plaintiff was proceeding in a southerly
direction along Wasatch Boulevard where it cuts through
the gully at Parley's Canyon in the inside lane of the
two southbound lanes of traffic. She had progressed beyond the low part of the gully and 'Yas on the upgrade
when her motor sputtered. When her motor started to
sputter she pulled it to the right and got as far to the
right as she could before the motor died (R 98). The
point 'Yhere the vehicle came to a stop was 3 to 4 blocks
south of the junction of W asa.tch Boulevard "~ith Parley's Way. (R. 99) There was a light snow falling at the
time. (R 96) The plaintiff's lights were burning on her
vehicle. (R 97) From the point 'vhere ~[rs. Durrant's
car was stopped one could see all of the high,Yay back to
Parley's Way including the dip (R 113). (See also Exhibit 7) There was other traffic follo,ving plaintiff in the
2
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snme lnne of traffic she \Vas in and she obserYed a fp"·
rnn~ trnvPling in thP ~arne direction as she turn out into
thP inside lane \vhen thPy "·ere 3 to 6 car lengths from
the plaintill"'s rar after she had come to a stop. (R 99)
~Irs. l)urrnnt, the plaintiff, while sitting in her car, turned
nrottnd in the sPat and looked back and observed the det't,ndnut 's rar and a truck carrying the witnesses, Mr. and
'Irs. Anderson, just coming down the hill past Parley's
\Vny. (R 98-99) l\Irs. Pelton's car was in front and they
wPrP thn'P to four blocks from plaintiff's car. After she ob~t~rvPd them shP turned back around and sat there waiting
for them to go out around her before she decided what
to do. ShP stated that the truck and car were traveling
t'nirly fast. (R 113) Shortly thereafter the impact ocrurred. \\"hPn she observed the defendant's car and the
follo"·ing t rurk slH' stated that they did not have their
light~ on. 'Vhen her car sputtered, it sounded like it
might ha ,.e been out of gas but she observed her gas
g-nng-P and it read 1/s full. (R 100) When the impact ocrnrred, plaintiff's glasses "'"hich she "\Vas wearing at the
time w·ere thro,vn into the back seat as 'vell as her gloves
\Yhieh she had on her hands. (R 104) She sustained a
"·hiplash injury (R 104), bruises to her chest, back, legs
nnd nbdomen. She incurred medical bills in the amount of
~t)~l.ll. Her injuries had healed completely by the time
of trial. (R 111)
In contrast to the foregoing facts the defendant testified th('t it had been sno,ving heavily for some time
hefore the accident, bnt at the same intensity before
!he aeeit1ent as of the time of the accident. (R 1233
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She stated her vision was limited by the sno"?' but
she could see 60 to 70 feet in front of her. (R 139) She had
her lights on but the plaintiff and some other cars did not
have their lights on. (R 136) She did not see the p1aintiff's car until she was within 30 feet of it. (R 123) She
was traveling at about 25 miles per hour (R 124) and she
stated that under the conditions that existed at the time
the accident oceurred she could not stop her car "·ithin
the distance she could see in front of her. (R 139) As
soon as she saw the car in front of her she immediately
applied her brakes but slid into the car. (R 126-127)

126)

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO THE
DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION TO l\IAINTAIN CONTROL OVER HER VEHICLE, TO
KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT AND TO
TRAVEL AT A REASONABLE SPEED.
Appellant contends that the giving of plaintiff'~ requested instructions No. 6, 7 and 8 was an adoption of
the doctrine of Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy, 80 Utah 331,
and that said rule announced in Dalley v. ]fidwestern
Dairy is no longer the Utah law. The three instructions
complained of by the defendant are instructions pertaining to lookout, control and the duty of a drivrr of
a. motor vehicle to drive at a reasonable speed under
the existing conditions. In the Dalley v. lVlidu:estern
Dairy case the court did announce and adopt the rule of
law that it is negligence as a matter of law for a person
4
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to dri\·e nn automobile on a. traveled public highway used
by vehieles and pedestrians at such a rate of speed that
said automobile cannot be stopped within the distance at
whieh the operator of said car is able to see objects upon
the high\\·ny in front of him, citing the cases of Nikoleropoulos ,.. Ran1sey, 61 Utah 465, 214 P. 304, and other

ThP plaintiff in its requested instruction No.2 (R. 31)
did, in faet, request the court to instruct the jury with respPrt to the use of lights and that it was negligence as a
mnttPr of la \V for a person to drive a. vehicle upon a highway nt a rate of speed that the vehicle could not be stopp(\d "·ithin the distance at v;hich the operator of the
,·rhirle "·as able to see objects on the high,Yay in front of
her and likewise, 'vith respect to driving at a. speed at
which she 'vas not able to stop when she saw plaintiff's
vehicle, but the court refused the instruction.

On thr fa.cts as they existed in the case of Dalley Y •
.llidw()sfern Dairy, our Supreme Court would apparently
still come to the same conclusion. However, there are exceptions to the general rule in the Dalley v. Mid~v-estern
Dairy case. Some of the exceptions to the general rule are
expressed in cases such as Nielson r. Wata;nabe, 90 Utah
401. 62 (P(2) 117, where the driver of a car 'vas suddenly
and unexpectedly blinded by the lights of an approaching
vehicle and "·hile so blinded the collision occurred. Under these circumstances the Utah Supreme Court held
that it ""as not contributory negligence as a matter of la":to run into an unlighted Yehicle but was a question of fact
for the jury. In Trinl.ble Y. r"nion Pacific Etages, 105
5
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Utah 457, 142 P(2) 674, the Utah Supreme Court heltl
that a bus driver was not negligent as a matter of law
where the automobile in which the plaintiff decedent \ras
riding \vas parked on the left shoulder of the higlnvay
\vithout lights and was struck by the bus when it suddenly entered a fog area. In the case of Hodges Y. lV aite,
270 P(2) 461, 2 Utah(2) 152, our court held that it \rns a
jury question as to whether or not the plaintiff \J{as guilty
of contributory negligence when he came around a cur\·e
which blocked his view and ran into the trailer of the defendant which \vas parked on the right shoulder of the
road with part of the trailer being upon the hard surfaee.
In the case of Federated Milk Producers Association v.
Statewide Plumbing a,n.d Heating Company, 11 Utah (2)
294, 358 P(2) 348, the headlights of an approaching car
and a large trenching machine on one side of the road
obscured and distracted the attention of the plaintiff and
the court again ruled that the plaintiff \vas not negligent
as a matter of law in failing to see an unlighted row of
dirt in time to have stopped before striking it, and that
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence was
a proper question for the jury.
In the case before this court the trial judge did not
make a ruling as a matter of law with respect to the negligence of the defendant but did properly submit it to the
jury on proper instructions defining the defendant's duty
\vith respect to lookout, speed and control.
There is a dispute in the evidence with respect to the
existing conditions at the time of the accident. However,
by the defendant's O\vn testimony it appears that the
6
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sno\\·storm, \vhatever the severity of it may have been,
wns of the snme relative intensity some time before the
nc<·itlent as it \Vas at the time of the accident. The det'endunt \ras, therefore, not surprised by the existence of
thP ~torm or the nature of it and if she was, as indicated
in her testimony, driving at a speed "~here she could not
~top '"ithin the range of her headlights the least that
<·ould he said would be that it would be a jury question as
tCl whether or not she was driving at a speed that was rea.sonuhlP and proper under the existing conditions. Likewi~P, her statement that she could see 60 to 70 feet in
front of her but that she didn't see the defendant's vehicle until she was 30 feet from it would again raise the
qnPstion as to whether or not she was keeping a proper
lookout and this also would be a question for the jury.
And again, if in fact the defendant was driving at a speed
\vhere she could not stop within the distance at which
~he could see objects in front of her, the issue of whether
nr not she had proper control of her vehicle would be a
proper one to submit to the jury.
The "~itnesses, ~Ir. and Mrs. Anderson, were aware
of the existence of the plaintiff's vehicle on the higlY\vay
t'rom the time they started down the hill until the time of
impact between the defendant's and plaintiff's vehicles.
If they \Yere able to observe the plaintiff's vehicle under
the same general circumstances that existed with respect
to the defendant then it would be a question for the jury
a~ to \vhether or not the defendant should also have seen
the plaintiff's vehicle and been aware of it before the
time she actually did observe it, according to her o"rn
tt'~timony.

7
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POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED IKSTRUCTION NO. 11.
On pages 4 and 5 of appellant's brief appellant states
that, "It is the obligation of the trial court, \vhen requested, to give an instruction which is oriented to the situation rather than to giYe a general instruction in terms
'vhich have little meaning to the lay mind." Appellant
has cited as error failure of the court to giYe its rrquested instruction No. 11 but an examination of the instruction indicates that the instruction is not oriented
to the particular situation that existed at the time this
accident occurred. For instance, there is no evidence
\Vha tsoever in the case that there \Yas any sudden heavy
smoke or any fog, any lightning, or a rainstorm, or that
in fact the headlights of the defendant were fault~r. Including these items in an instruction pertaining to this
case "rould be error.
The defendant complains about the rourt 's giving the instruction it did on unavoidable accidents, but
the defendant in its requested instruction No. 10 requested the court to give the instruction on unavoidable accidents as it "ras given by the court. Respondent, therefore,
submits that the court properly refused to gi,~e the appellant's instruction No. 11 as requested.

POINT III.
THE COURT DID XOT ERR IX FAILING TO
GIVE .L\PPEI.JI.i.ANT'S REQUESTED IKSTRUCTION NO. 13.
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~\ppcllant

in her brief at page 14 has claimed that re~pondrnt alleged shP ran out of gas and that appellant
ndmittPd it..A review of the pleading 'viii show that appt-llant in her answer (R 3) denied that plaintiff ran out
of gas and alleged that plaintiff in fact parked her vehi<'le on the highway. The pre-trial order set up the issues
to he trieu. One of defendant's contentions "~hich 'vas
set up as an issue to be tried was that plaintiff 'vas negligl'nt ''in failing to have her car properly fueled so the
snmP would not run out of gas at a. dangerous time and
plare." (R 7) The burden of showing this was upon the
dPfendant. Defendant also still contended that plaintiff
parked her car and this was an issue. (R 7)
.. \ t the time of trial plaintiff testified without objec-

tion upon the part of the defendant (R 100, 101) that she
did not kno\v 'vhy her car sputtered and stopped; that in
t'a~t her gas gauge did not read empty but Ys full a.nd
that later she drove the car a short distance before putting any gas in it. (R 116) Appellant's counsel on page
13 of his brief claims that he objected to such testimony
being given but the record is to the contrary. After all
the t'\vidence \vas in and both parties had rested, the plaintiff moved the court for an order allowing plaintiff to
nmend the complaint to conform to the evidence or proof
thnt w·as offered. (R 74) This was the first time defendnut's counsel objected. The court granted the motion
(R 73 ). Defendant had already filed his request for in~trurtions from 1 to 12 (R 38) which did not include any
request pertaining to negligence " . ith respect to running
Put of ~a~ and it 'vas only after plaintiff's motion to
9
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amend had been granted that defendant then filed the
requested instruction No. 13 asking the court to instrurt
the jury that they must find that plaintiff's automobilP
stalled upon the high\vay by reason of the exhaustion of
its gas supply. The defendant never did request an instruction pertaining to whether or not one is JH•gli.~·( 1 llt
if her car stalls by reason of the exhaustion of h<-~r ga~
supply.
In appellant's brief, K cllar v. Brenc1uau ~ 133 \Vash.
208, 279 P. 588, has been cited supporting the doctrine
that a driver is guilty of negligence in operating his rar
over a high·w·ay in a condition \Yhere it becomes stalled
for \Yant of a sufficient gas supply, it is further stated
that research has revealed no judicial statement of a
contrary view. The respondent desires to cite a fe\Y rases
to the contrary.
In the case of Fick v. H ernzan Oil Trausport Company, Nebraska 11 CCH (2) 366, a 1955 case, a truck
tank combination hauling gasoline ran out of gas. The
driver had failed to check it before leaving on a trip
assuming that the driver \vho had last driven the truck
had in accordance "Tith usual practice had the gasoline
tank filled. The road point \Y here the tank ran out of
~ras had about a ten foot shoulder but it \Yas soft and
,...,
muddy at the time and the driver of the truck, therefore,
pulled over to the right as far as he could \Yithout going
out on the shoulder. The plaintiff vehicle ran into the
rear of the tanker. The plaintiff charged the drivrr of
the tanker \Yith negligence in failing to check the fuel
and for running out of gas on the high''Tay. This issue

10
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wns submitted to the jury.

On appeal, the appellant cited

ns Prror the fuilure of the trial court to withdraw this
issu~. On appeal, the trial court held the mere stalling of
n vehirle temporarily on the highway caused by the exhaustion of the gas supply would not ipso facto constit uh• negligence as a matter of law and in this case there
ht•ing no evidence to show that the driver 'vas negligent the issue should have been withdrawn from the jury.
In the case of Rath v. Bankston, a 1929 California
('US(\, 281 P. 1081, the court held that the truck driver's
failure to maintain sufficient fuel in the gasoline tank was
excusable 'vhere the same procedure as to refilling the
tank had been sufficient on previous trips.
In Volume 2, Section 824, Blashfield, Permanent Edition, at page 3, it is stated:
•' Generally speaking it is the duty of a driver on
a. highway to see that the car is maintained in such
condition as to the fuel supply that it may not become a menace on the highway to other traffic by
stopping on the road, and failure to exercise reasonable care to keep it in proper condition in this
respect is negligence. But if a motorist has exercised reasonable care, an unforeseen failure of his
gasoline supply does not constitute negligence.''
The respondent, therefore, submits that the court
was not in error in failing to allow plaintiff to amend her
complaint. It 'vas only amended to conform to the proof
and the issues already set up and consequently the court
like,vise did not err in refusing to give appellant's reqnPsted instruction X o. 13.
11
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CONCLUSION
The court's instructions were fair and proper and n
fair trial was had by both parties. The trial court's judgment on the jury verdict should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI and
LAWRENCE L. SUl\IMERHAYS
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Respondent
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